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Embracing Uncertainty:  
Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China 
 
Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry 
 
 
Observers have been predicting the imminent demise of the Chinese political 
system since the death of Mao Zedong more than thirty years ago. Such forecasts gained 
currency and urgency with the Tiananmen Uprising twenty years ago, when it did appear 
that the regime was tottering on the verge of collapse.1 Although the PRC managed to 
outlast both East European and Soviet variants of Communism, predictions of its 
impending demise did not disappear. In the last several years we have seen a steady 
parade of books with titles such as The Coming Collapse of China; China’s Trapped 
Transition; China: Fragile Superpower, or more optimistically, China’s Democratic 
Future: How it will Happen and Where it will Lead.2   
The rapid economic growth of the post-Mao era generated expectations of a 
commensurate political transformation.  To sustain such economic progress in the face of 
mounting social unrest, it was widely believed, would require jettisoning an outmoded 
Communist Party in favor of liberal democratic institutions. With each passing decade, 
however, the characterization of the Chinese Communist system as exhausted and about 
to expire rings a little more hollow.  Far from decrepit, the regime – having weathered 
Mao’s death in 1976, the Tiananmen Uprising in 1989, Deng’s death in 1997, and large-
scale ethnic riots in 2008-9 — seems over time to have become increasingly adept at 
managing tricky challenges ranging from leadership succession and popular unrest to 
administrative reorganization, legal institutionalization, and even global economic 
integration. Contrary to expectations, the PRC regime has proven surprisingly capable of 
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surviving serious unanticipated crises, from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-99 
through the SARS epidemic of 2003 to the global economic downturn of 2008-9. These 
challenges would have sounded the death knell to many a less hardy regime.  
To be sure, the phenomenon of rapid economic growth without political 
liberalization comes at a high price.  The absence of civil liberties for ordinary Chinese 
citizens is perhaps the most obvious and egregious of these costs. But the lack of political 
restraints also contributes to numerous other serious problems in the contemporary PRC, 
from cadre corruption to the weakness of consumer protections and environmental 
degradation.  It is certainly conceivable that some combination of these vulnerabilities 
will lead sooner or later to systemic change.   
We hazard no predictions about how long Communist Party rule in China may 
persist. The vagaries of historical contingency render any such exercise of limited utility.  
Nor do we speculate about what an alternative future political system might look like.  
Such prescriptions are better left to Chinese policy makers and political reformers 
themselves.  Instead, as social scientists we intend to take a fresh look at the reasons and, 
more precisely, the policy mechanisms3 behind the staying power of Communist Party 
rule up to this point: How has the Communist Party in China achieved such rapid and 
profound organizational, economic and social change over the last three decades? What 
political techniques and procedures has the authoritarian regime employed to manage the 
unsettling impact of the fastest sustained economic expansion in world history – a  
transformation that has brought with it not only greater wealth and global clout, but also 
political-ideological contestation, growing income and regional inequality, and rampant 
popular protest?   
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China as a “Black Swan” 
Conventional political science models of regime types and regime transitions, 
constructed around dichotomous systemic categories stemming from the Cold War period 
(“from dictatorship to democracy”, “from plan to market”, etc.), assign almost no 
adaptability to Communist party-states. Institutionally speaking, Communist political 
systems are judged to be inflexible and incapable of continuous improvements in 
administrative organization, economic coordination, technological innovation and 
international competitiveness.4  This explanatory framework has not proven particularly 
useful in understanding the complex dynamics of an innovative, competitive and 
powerful China, however. In light of that country’s unusual development record, it has  
become increasingly problematic to try to shoehorn China into the shopworn categories 
of Cold War regime types, even by adding numerous attributes to the original categories.5  
China has not taken the road anticipated by Western social scientists and desired 
by Western publics. Marketization has not spelled democratization. Although the intense 
ideological pressures, struggle campaigns and organized dependency6 of the Mao era 
have given way to a more regular administrative and technocratic, in some fields even 
consultative, mode of governance, China has made no transition in the direction of 
electoral, pluralist democracy. It remains an authoritarian party-state, characterized by 
Leninist institutions. Yet China’s Soviet-inspired formal institutions are combined with 
distinctive governance methods shaped by the Chinese Communists’ own revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary past and, in the post-Mao era, complemented by selective 
borrowing from “advanced” foreign organizational and regulatory practices. It is these 
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governance techniques, we argue, that account for the otherwise puzzling pattern of 
spectacular economic success under the aegis of an institutionally unreformed 
Communist system. 
Though market coordination has gained considerable ground in China’s economy, 
the state still controls the “commanding heights” in key industries (from infrastructure to 
telecommunication and finance) through public property rights, pervasive administrative 
interference, and Communist Party supervision of senior managers. China’s political 
economy thus diverges fundamentally from the Anglo-American marketization-cum-
privatization paradigm. Moreover, China’s Communist Party-guided capitalism also 
deviates from core features of the Japanese and South Korean “developmental state” in 
which state enterprises, public property and political control over senior executives 
played only a very limited role and in which foreign trade liberalization was introduced at 
a much more mature state of development than in China.7  
As this volume will detail, many contemporary methods of governance crucial to 
sustaining Communist Party rule in a shifting and uncertain environment can be traced 
back to formative revolutionary experiences. China’s governance techniques are marked 
by a signature Maoist stamp that conceives of policy-making as a process of ceaseless 
change, tension management, continual experimentation, and ad-hoc adjustment.  Such 
techniques reflect a mindset and method that contrasts sharply with the more bureaucratic 
and legalistic approaches to policy-making that obtain in many other major polities. 
Due to its idiosyncratic developmental pathway over the past thirty years, 
contemporary China presents an enigma not only to the field of Chinese politics – which 
did not predict the surprising resilience of the Communist system under reform and has 
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yet to provide a convincing explanation for it. It also poses a major puzzle to the field of 
comparative politics, where prevailing theories of modernization, democratization and 
regime transition offer little illumination for the case of post-Mao China to date.8  
China stands as a “Black Swan” challenge to the social sciences:9 The political 
resilience of the Communist party-state, in combination with a rapidly expanding, 
internationally competitive and integrated economy, represents a significant deviant and 
unpredicted case with a huge potential impact not only on the global distribution of 
political and economic power but also on the global debate about models of development. 
Framed in the terms of social science methodology, China’s exceptional development 
trajectory represents an “extreme value on an independent or dependent variable of 
general interest”.10  As such, it offers a challenge to conventional wisdom as well as to 
conventional models of political change. 
In relying upon concepts and theories derived from more familiar historical 
trajectories (e.g., the triumph of Western liberal democracies over Communist regimes at 
the end of the last century) to examine a political economy that emerged from very 
different experiences, analysts have tended to dismiss potentially powerful innovations as 
irregularities, deviations, externalities or simply dead-ends. But what if China is in fact 
pursuing a unique path, and – due to its size, history and surprising success – introducing 
important unconventional, non-Western techniques to the repertoire of governance in the 
21st century?  Whether the PRC’s institutional and policy solutions over the past three 
decades turn out to be transitional remains uncertain, but in any case they have served the 
Communist Party’s management of economic and social change remarkably effectively 
so far, and for that reason alone deserve our serious attention as social scientists.  If these 
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techniques persist much longer, they will surely command widespread public interest and 
concern as well. 
With this volume, we wish to sound a cautionary note against the common 
tendency among Western observers to trivialize the contributions of political leadership 
and policy initiatives in China by reducing that country’s politics to an unremitting 
interplay of repression and resistance. In doing so, we seek not to celebrate the reform 
record of the PRC, but to understand it. Such understanding requires in the first instance 
an investigation of origins. Identifying the roots of contemporary methods of governance 
is important for analyzing both the genesis and the generalizability of the specific array of 
solutions, institutions, and processes at work in China today.  Those roots are firmly 
planted, we will argue, in the fertile soil of the Maoist past. The usual practice of 
restricting the study of contemporary Chinese political economy to the reform period has 
had the unfortunate effect of obscuring key sources of its dynamism. By contrast, this 
volume focuses on the formative legacy of revolutionary (1927-1949) and early PRC 
(1949-1976) techniques of policy creation and implementation that we label, as a 
shorthand, “Maoist.”11   
There were important variations within that eventful half century of “Maoist” 
political history, to be sure.  At certain moments both before and after the political 
victory of 1949, Mao Zedong’s distinctive mass mobilization methods were challenged 
by a more orthodox Soviet style of bureaucratic control.  That Mao’s approach won out 
repeatedly in these conflicts did not redound to the benefit of the Chinese people.  The 
more disastrous elements of the Great Leap Forward exemplified the negative 
consequences of an unbridled Maoist mode of development.  Leadership and ideology 
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would prove decisive in determining whether the power of revolutionary governance 
would be put toward destructive or productive ends. 
 
Prevailing Institutional Explanations 
  In highlighting the importance of revolutionary experience on contemporary 
practice, we depart from mainstream explanations of regime resilience.  As scholars have 
begun to seek an answer to the puzzling vigor of the Chinese Communist system, they 
have generally concentrated on the role of institutional factors. According to Andrew 
Nathan, the Chinese regime’s surprising resilience can be attributed to its 
institutionalization of the elite succession process and containment of factionalism as 
well as its success in fostering a “high level of acceptance” through various “input 
institutions” – local elections, letters-and-visits departments, people’s congresses, 
administrative litigation, mass media and the like.12 David Shambaugh also sees the 
Chinese Communist Party as “a reasonably strong and resilient institution” and suggests 
that “a range of intraparty reforms, as well as reforms affecting other sectors of the state, 
society and economy” have contributed to the party’s ruling capacity.13 Barry Naughton 
and Dali Yang point out that “China has retained a core element of central control: the 
nomenklatura system of personnel management” and argue that “this nomenklatura 
personnel system is the most important institution reinforcing national unity.” 14 As 
Andrew Walder has observed, although the composition of the political elite has changed 
dramatically since Mao’s day (reflecting, among other things, an exponential growth in 
its educational credentials), its organizational structure has been remarkably stable.15 
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  While the above scholars have looked to formal institutions as the basis of regime 
resilience, others have emphasized the role of informal institutions. Kellee Tsai, for 
example, credits the contribution of “informal adaptive institutions”, such as the 
transitional practice of private entrepreneurs to register their enterprises as collectively 
owned, with having pressured the central authorities to adopt new measures (e.g., 
admitting private entrepreneurs to the Chinese Communist Party) that have inadvertently 
served to strengthen state stability.16 Lily Tsai notes the value of local “informal 
institutions of accountability” (e.g., temple associations and lineages) for the provision of 
public goods in rural China. According to her analysis, these solidary groups (which 
include local officials as well as ordinary villagers) generate increased support for the 
government in the Chinese countryside.17 
A full answer to the resilience of the Chinese Communist system to date is of 
course complex, having varied over time under different leaders and with respect to 
different challenges. We do not discount the role of either formal or informal institutions 
in this process. But why has China alone benefited from such institutions? After all, a 
defining feature of Communist systems is their common institutional structure: Leninist 
party, collectivized production, command economy, centralized propaganda apparatus, 
coercive public security apparatus, and so forth. What, then, accounts for the glaring 
difference between the contemporary Chinese experience and that of other formerly 
Communist countries?  Why has China proven more tolerant of informal institutions than 
many of its erstwhile counterparts elsewhere in the world?  And why did China – in 
contrast to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe – not only survive the 1989 crisis with 
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its party-state system intact, but then in the space of a single generation manage to 
engineer an economic and social transformation of such stunning proportions?   
We believe that much of the explanation for this singular achievement lies in the 
creative adaptation of key elements of China’s revolutionary heritage. Unlike Russia and 
Eastern Europe, the imposition of a national Communist regime in China required nearly 
three decades of revolutionary mobilization and struggle. In the course of that protracted 
process, which took the Communists out of the major cities into the rural hinterland and 
on a Long March from the southern to the northern regions of the country, invaluable 
lessons in adapting to a wide range of different environmental conditions and challenges 
were learned. That these rich revolutionary experiences led directly to the dramatic 
successes – as well as the dismal failures – of Chairman Mao’s radical programs during 
the initial years of the PRC is well recognized.18  The origins of the mass campaigns of 
the 1950s and 1960s, which brought improved literacy and basic health care but also the 
worst famine of the 20th century and severe environmental damage,19 are readily traceable 
to the revolutionary policies of the wartime base areas. 
Less widely acknowledged, however, is the continued importance of 
revolutionary precedents in the techniques of rule and policy-making employed by Mao’s 
successors. On the contrary, reform-era China is usually characterized as a post-
revolutionary society in which, with the notable exception of the Leninist party-state, 
Maoist ideas and initiatives have been thoroughly discredited and dismantled.20 In the 
aftermath of the Cold War, with ideological conflict having seemingly been superseded 
by economic competition, the revolutionary past is generally regarded as a historical 
curiosity at most.   
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Despite the institutional commonalities among Communist countries, China from 
its revolutionary days to the present has chosen a singular path. Unlike the Soviet Union 
and its East European satellites, Mao’s China exhibited a trademark policy style that 
favored continual experimentation and transformation (or “permanent revolution”) over 
regime consolidation. The erratic and idiosyncratic course navigated by the Great 
Helmsman in his quixotic quest to continue the revolution after 1949 was terribly 
disruptive and destructive, to be sure, but the protean approach that underlay it remained 
available for more productive uses. China’s long revolution had given rise to a “guerrilla-
style policy-making”21 approach that proved capable of generating an array of creative – 
proactive as well as evasive – tactics for managing sudden change and uncertainty. With 
new political leadership and policy priorities, these familiar practices could lead to very 
different outcomes. 
The wartime base areas’ formula of encouraging decentralized initiative within 
the framework of centralized political authority proved highly effective when redirected 
to the economic modernization objectives of Mao’s successors. Unlike other countries 
saddled with the rigid top-down legacies of Leninist parties and command economies,  
some of whose leaders also proposed bold reforms, the Chinese polity has proven 
singularly adept at adjusting to the demands of domestic economic reform and global 
market competition. A major reason for this glaring difference is China’s unusual 
receptivity to on-the-ground generation of new knowledge and practice – a feature, we 
believe, that derives in large measure from many of the same policy mechanisms that 
propelled the Chinese Communists’ protracted revolutionary struggle. 
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From an institutional angle, the Chinese polity fits the standard definition of an 
authoritarian Communist party-state. Yet China’s vast and bureaucratically fragmented 
political system is animated by policy processes that allow for far greater bottom-up input 
than would be predicted from its formal structures.  These processes are fundamental to 
the PRC’s resilience and adaptability. 
 
Political Resilience and Adaptive Governance 
What do we mean by resilience and adaptability? Resilience can be defined as the 
capacity of a system to experience and absorb shocks and disturbance “while retaining 
essentially the same function, structure, feedbacks, and therefore identity.”22 In turn, 
adaptability can be defined as “the capacity of actors in a system to further resilience” 
through their actions and interactions, intentionally or unintentionally. The foundation of 
adaptability in this sense is response diversity: a variety of reactive, digestive, preemptive 
and proactive operations and procedures that facilitate continual adjustment to and 
absorption of endogenous and exogenous challenges. In these agency-oriented definitions 
of resilience and adaptability, institutional mechanisms are only one, sometimes minor, 
element. Behavioral and cognitive processes are critical; adaptiveness depends upon 
people’s readiness to venture forth into unfamiliar environments to act, experiment and 
learn from changing circumstances.  
Historical institutionalist Douglass North puts adaptive capacity at the center of 
his explanation of developmental success. He notes that in political and economic 
systems alike, adaptive capacity is facilitated by formal and informal institutions and 
norms that enable actors in the system to try out various options. A broad spectrum of 
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plausible alternative solutions is needed to escape developmental blockages, tackle 
emerging challenges, and grasp new opportunities.23  Nassim Taleb gives the discussion 
on adaptive governance a new twist by proposing that innovative strength varies not 
according to systemic features (market vs. plan, democracy vs. authoritarianism) but by 
the opportunities afforded for “maximum tinkering.” The prerequisite to such tinkering in 
any political economy is the openness to random discoveries of novel solutions on the 
part of its institutions, processes, and actors.  Intensive tinkering can take place in non-
democracies so long as rulers are willing to encourage the decentralized generation of 
new knowledge.24 In this volume, we seek to show why China has provided a political 
setting conducive to the kind of broad-based tinkering that development theorists such as 
Dani Rodrik identify as essential for discovering policy alternatives that have the 
potential to propel economic and social development if built into specific domestic 
conditions and adapted to a changing global environment.25 
 
The Potential of Retrospective Governance Studies 
To explain the adaptive capacities of China’s polity, the contributors to this 
volume look to the historical experiences and techniques of Communist Party rule under 
Mao Zedong, and their retention, reinvention, and renovation under Mao’s successors. 
The chapters to come will trace specific linkages between revolutionary precedents and 
contemporary practices in a range of policy areas: agricultural development, health care, 
social regulation, legal reform, media control, public opinion surveillance, sub-country 
governance, and central-local relations. Rather than rest content with vague analogies 
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between past and present, the authors focus on concrete mechanisms of governance cast 
during the Maoist era and recast by the post-Mao leadership.  
The approach adopted here bears some similarity to that of historical 
institutionalism, inasmuch as we monitor continuities and changes in political trajectories 
over time. But the authors depart in important ways from that approach. Rather than trace 
the “path-dependent” evolution of an institution as it unfolded seamlessly from some 
previous “critical juncture,”26 we start our analyses with prominent features of China’s 
contemporary political scene and then work backwards in search of their (often tortuous) 
historical origins. The chapters of this volume, although differing substantially in content 
and conclusions, comprise retrospective studies of governance in a variety of key policy 
arenas.   
A major advantage of retrospective governance studies is their open research 
design. When new actors, interests, or ideologies enter the scene, the approach easily 
accommodates such additions – in contrast to the more deterministic, prestructured 
models of institutional political economy. Moreover, our approach promises to avoid the 
teleological tendency so pervasive in social science debates about China’s transformation 
(ever on the outlook for signs of “real” market economy or “real” democracy) by leaving 
open the future possibility of unorthodox mechanisms, overlooked actors, unexpected 
interactions, and random interventions. Rather than biasing expectations in light of 
familiar Western models, we adopt an inductive outlook that views modern and 
contemporary Chinese history as an uncertain process of discovery – not as a trajectory 
pre-ordained by past experiences (or present-day social science paradigms).  
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In adopting this open-ended approach, one discovers in contemporary China a 
complex amalgam of governance mechanisms that combine Maoist, post-Mao and 
borrowed foreign elements. Moving from the Mao era’s “socialist construction” to the 
post-Mao era’s “reform and opening”, China has not simply jettisoned its revolutionary 
past as it “transits” toward a democratic future. Rather, a succession of post-Mao leaders 
have managed to fashion a surprisingly adaptive pattern of authoritarian rule capable so 
far of withstanding challenges, including grievous and growing social and spatial 
inequalities, which would surely have undone less robust or flexible regimes. We 
obviously do not claim that revolutionary origins will tell us everything we need or want 
to know about the Chinese regime’s resilience. But we do believe that this particular 
focus provides an important complement – and in some cases corrective – to prevailing 
approaches.   
 
Institutional Plasticity and Policy Style Continuity 
Institutional and policy instability have been prominent features of Chinese 
politics throughout the last century. Except for a small number of crucial core institutions, 
such as the Communist Party’s hierarchical cadre system that Naughton and Yang rightly 
identify as a pillar of China’s polity, few organizational arrangements have functioned 
continuously over the entire history of the PRC.27 Party, government, and legal 
institutions were subject to frequent and sometimes wild shake-ups and re-
organizations.28 Policy volatility was extreme by any comparative standard until at least 
1993 when China’s leadership settled on the formula of a “socialist market economy”.  
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If institutions and policies were so unstable under Communist rule, where then do 
we look for continuities and guiding principles?  How have Chinese policymakers 
responded when facing challenges or initiating programs that could not be handled 
through bureaucratic “autopilot” procedures?  The common ground that connects the 
contributions in this volume, beyond the historical legacy argument, is a focus on policy 
style – or a government’s guiding methodology for tackling shifting policy tasks.29 An 
important concern in public administration theory, the concept of “policy style” opens a 
revealing window on the issue of continuity and change in contemporary China. While 
PRC institutions and policies have been subject to frequent shifts over time, major 
components of the Communist Party’s policy style have remained surprisingly stable, 
even across the widely accepted watershed of the Mao and post-Mao eras.  
In adopting a policy style perspective, we are not simply imposing yet another 
abstract Western concept on China. The term zuofeng (usually translated as “work style”) 
permeates Chinese administrative practice. Pointing to durable policy-making routines 
and administrative habits that are neither formalized nor reflected upon, yet encompass a 
set of generally accepted problem-solving techniques, zuofeng is very similar in meaning 
to the concept in public administration studies of “policy style.”30 Here we have a rare 
case where the technical terms of Western social science theory and the discourse of 
Chinese administrative practice actually intersect.  
Once a mainstay of scholarship on Chinese politics, policy studies have been 
overshadowed in recent years by the field’s fascination with “civil society,” “social 
movements,” “rights consciousness,” and other phenomena often associated with the rise 
of a market economy.  The relative research accessibility of such phenomena, when 
 16 
contrasted to the opaqueness of the Chinese political elite, has understandably contributed 
to the shift in scholarly priorities. The decline of policy studies is unfortunate, however, 
since in China’s state-heavy political economy administrative coordination and state 
intervention remain at least as decisive as market exchanges. The policy process holds a 
special importance for explaining not only political interaction and rule-making, but also 
economic markets and social trends that in China are in no way independent of state 
interference. The policy process is a key mechanism for connecting (both empirically and 
analytically) formal hierarchies, informal networks, market transactions and social 
interactions.  
 
Guerrilla Policy Style   
The exceptional institutional and policy instability of PRC history is usually 
attributed to the erratic and divisive behaviour of paramount leaders.31 Such behaviour, 
we propose, reflects a deeper policy style whose basic components stem in large measure 
from the formative experience of guerrilla warfare and revolutionary mobilization. In the 
course of surviving and surmounting seemingly impossible odds, Mao and his colleagues 
came to appreciate the advantages of agility over stability.   
The guerrilla policy style of the PRC leadership includes a shared understanding32 
about political agency and a distinctive methodology of policy generation that enabled 
success in the unpredictable military combat settings of revolutionary times, and that 
bequeathed a dynamic means of navigating the treacherous rapids of transformative 
governance in both the Mao era (“socialist construction”, “permanent revolution”) and 
the post-Mao era (“four modernizations”, “reform and opening”, “socialist market 
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economy”, “joining the world (world economy/world trade organization)” [入世]). Core 
features of what we call guerrilla policy style continue to shape present-day policy-
making and have contributed to the flexibility, and volatility, of Communist Party rule.  
The proven ability of mobile guerrilla warfare to reap unexpected gains in a 
highly uncertain and threatening environment left an indelible imprint on Chinese policy-
makers who took part in the revolution (including the age cohorts of Mao, Deng, and Hu 
Yaobang, which dominated Chinese politics until at least the early 1990s). The Maoist 
guerrilla approach to problem-solving issued from almost thirty years of incessant 
political and military struggles that the Communists fought from a militarily inferior – 
and at times seemingly hopeless – position. It was marked by secrecy, versatility, speed 
and surprise. Over the course of the revolution, continuous improvisation became a 
defining feature of Chinese Communist tactics. Moreover, Mao made abundantly clear 
that war and politics were to be played according to the same rules. As he stated in 1959: 
“Military affairs are politics under special conditions. They are a continuation of politics. 
Politics are also a type of war.”33 
The legacies of the guerrilla policy style in China have attracted scant attention 
from Western scholars.34  Yet core features of contemporary Chinese policymaking are 
also defining characteristics of Chinese guerrilla warfare.35 Beyond the well known 
combination of centralized leadership with intensive popular mobilization (“mass line”), 
the guerrilla mode of political leadership and policy-making revolves around the 
following shared understandings:  
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§ the political world and its power constellations are subject to eternal flux and 
ceaseless change that cannot be effectively halted or channelled by political-legal 
institution-building; 
§ policy-making should be kept fluid by trying to avoid binding constraints (e.g., 
personal pre-commitments or legal-contractual obligations) so as to retain political 
initiative and room for policy revision;  
§ policy-making is a process of continual improvisation and adjustment that “shapes 
itself in the making”36; 
§ recurrent standard operating procedures that could be discerned by enemy forces 
should be avoided;  
§ advice derived from theory and abstract models is not to be trusted; instead, new 
methods of action are derived from pilot efforts and practical experience in concrete 
settings; 
§ strategic decisions are the preserve of the top leadership; yet operationalization and 
implementation require substantial latitude for local initiative and independence;  
§ tensions among political forces and within society should be actively manipulated to 
take full advantage of political opportunities37;   
§ unexpected opportunities should be ruthlessly exploited to weaken or eliminate 
political enemies; alliances should be forged or broken as conditions dictate; 
§ risk should be minimized by launching new campaigns and staging direct 
confrontations only in the most favourable environment. 
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The policy style that emerges from these stratagems is fundamentally dictatorial, 
opportunistic and merciless. Unchecked by institutions of accountability, guerrilla leaders 
pursue their objectives with little concern for the interests of those who stand in their way. 
But with regard to adaptive capacity, the approach produces maximum creativity since 
policy-makers are required to: 
§ test and push constantly the limits of the status quo and seize every possible 
opportunity for changing the situation to their advantage; 
§ keep the core strategic objectives firmly in mind, yet be as agile and pragmatic as 
possible in choosing tactical, operational means; 
§ tinker with a full range of available operational tactics and organizational approaches, 
be they traditional, non-traditional, even foreign; 
§ search for and exploit random opportunities and discoveries that promise to promote 
political power and strategic goals.  
The policy style shaped by these basic features can be characterized as a change-oriented 
“push-and-seize” style that contrasts with the stability-oriented “anticipate-and-regulate” 
norm of modern constitutional government and rule-of-law polities (which typically 
aspire to a predictable environment where political leaders are held accountable for their 
actions). It shares, however, certain affinities with the “business as warfare” theme that 
permeates recent writing on market competition by today’s captains of global 
capitalism.38  
In the guerrilla policy style, political accountability is sacrificed to the goal of 
leadership flexibility, expressed in the Maoist formula of “politics in command” (政治挂
帅 zhengzhi guashuai). In theory, lower-level leaders are subject to supervision by their 
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Communist Party superiors. Since oversight is sketchy and episodic, however, local 
policy-makers are not credibly constrained. In post-Mao local government, we find 
widespread evidence at the grassroots level of entrepreneurial, experimentalist, 
opportunistic and ruthless policy-makers who simultaneously advance both their careers 
and their material interests. In so doing, they embody classic features, including the 
downsides and risks, of the guerrilla policy style.  The guerrilla fighter is a populist, not a 
democrat. 
Mao’s conversion of guerrilla warfare to a mode of political governance was 
driven by Machiavellian calculations.  As Michel Oksenberg observed, “Mao’s pattern of 
rule… [was an]… effort to control . . .  the process of policy-making by determining 
communication channels, personnel appointments and military deployment… [to] avoid 
becoming the captive of the administrative apparatus… Mao had to use informal means 
(such as the use of personal ties) or counter-institutions (such as campaigns) in order to 
make the formal mechanisms which he only partially created responsive to his will”.39 
 The guerrilla policy style stands in stark contrast to democratic norms of political 
accountability, legal consistency, and procedural stability. It also stands in clear tension 
to the formal bureaucratic norms that are an important part of the Soviet Communist 
tradition and that competed with Mao’s free-wheeling style even in his own day.40 
Although bureaucracy has gained a more secure status in post-Mao China, 
comprehensive rounds of “rectification” and restructuring remain a conspicuous feature 
of Chinese politics.41 Forceful top-down policy initiatives, interventions and campaigns 
that disrupt bureaucratic routines and shake up bureaucratic organizations continue to 
occur.  
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In addition to its negative impact on political accountability and procedural 
predictability, guerrilla policy style generates difficulties for central-local interaction and 
inter-regional distribution. To maximize flexibility and reduce the burden (and 
accountability) of the central leadership, the division of labor among different command 
levels is un-clarified and under-institutionalized. In effect, localities are generally left to 
fend for themselves, receiving only erratic and episodic central support. Although this 
may work to boost local policy creativity and operational autonomy, the lack of centrally 
coordinated redistribution also generates stark interregional disparities and 
underequipped “local government on a shoestring”.42  
Guerrilla policy-making consists of malleable stratagems that are employed in 
multiple variations and applications in response to shifting constellations of political 
forces.  These stratagems only work if they are used in such a way as to surprise one’s 
competitors. Guerrilla-style policy-making calls for circumventing existing rules, 
overcoming constraints, maximizing one’s own maneuverability while minimizing or 
eliminating opponents’ influence on the course of events.  
Moving back beyond Communist Party history to probe more deeply into the 
Chinese past, one may observe that basic features of the guerrilla policy style are 
congruent with a long and influential line of traditional thought which stressed fluid, 
dialectical and tactical approaches to managing ubiquitous tensions and contradictions.43 
The ancient Book of Changes presented an image of the world as subject to continuous 
flux driven by the ceaseless interaction of opposing elements.  Sunzi’s Art of War 
reflected a similar view in its military prescriptions: “All warfare is based on deception.  
Hence when able to attack we must seem unable; when using our forces we must seem 
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inactive; when we are near we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when we 
are far away, we must make him believe we are near.” .What Iain Johnston has labelled 
as the dominant “parabellum paradigm” of Chinese strategic culture assumes the ubiquity 
of conflict and the attendant advantages of “absolute flexibility” in the application of 
violence.44  Thanks in part perhaps to these powerful cultural and intellectual legacies, 
Chinese leaders seem inclined toward a strategic outlook that differs markedly from that 
of many Western democratic politicians.   
 
Preview of the Volume 
 The chapters to follow offer retrospective studies of a variety of important policy 
arenas in contemporary China.  They do not pretend to be either comprehensive or 
consistent.  Many critical governance issues (e.g., education, religion, and internal 
security to name but a few) are not covered.  And the authors reach different conclusions 
on many points, from the particular origins of the various practices they examine to the 
degree of continuity and discontinuity in these practices over the Mao and post-Mao eras.  
Some of the disagreements can be attributed to the particular policies under consideration, 
whereas others reflect divergent interpretations on the part of the authors themselves.  
Despite such inconsistencies, the chapters point toward what we believe to be a coherent, 
fruitful and under-utilized avenue for explaining the surprising resilience and adaptability 
of the Chinese Communist regime.  Even in the “post-revolutionary” setting of the 
contemporary PRC, the often invisible hand of Chairman Mao merits serious analytical 
attention. Tamed, tweaked, and transformed, to be sure, his guerrilla policy style still 
plays an important role in China’s governing practices. 
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 Elizabeth Perry’s opening chapter explores the legacy of a defining element of the 
Chinese revolutionary tradition: the mass campaign.  Put to dramatic (and sometimes 
devastating) use by Mao and his comrades from the 1930s on, the mass campaign was 
declared defunct by Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of the reform era in 1978.  
Nonetheless, Perry argues, campaigns have continued to constitute an important and 
effective resource for policy experimentation throughout the reform era.  Based on an 
examination of the contemporary rural development program to “construct a new 
socialist countryside,” Perry suggests that mass campaigns have been modified of late 
into “managed campaigns” that are more eclectic in both sources of inspiration and 
methods of implementation than their Maoist forebears.  Despite such adjustments, 
Chinese leaders’ continued reliance on campaign methods perpetuates certain negative 
aspects of Maoism, including the often callous disregard for actual (as opposed to 
imagined) preferences of rural inhabitants. 
Sebastian Heilmann’s chapter traces the distinctive “point to surface” method of 
Chinese policy making back to the establishment of Mao Zedong’s first rural base area of 
Jinggangshan in 1928.  Operating in an impoverished remote mountainous setting for 
which standard Leninist revolutionary prescriptions offered little guidance, the Chinese 
Communists developed an experimental brand of policy formulation that became a 
cornerstone of Maoist revolutionary strategy.  In the guerrilla tradition, leaders made up 
policies as they went along, in response to a changing environment. The method 
underwent important transformation during the early years of the PRC (with the 
imposition of centrally designated models for national emulation), but remained available 
for post-Mao leaders to redirect to the goal of economic modernization. Even today, 
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thanks to this “experimentation under hierarchy” approach, trial implementation of 
controversial or risky reforms in limited domains regularly precedes the enactment of 
national laws: risky policies are tried out first, spread to larger areas secondly, and only 
written into national law as a last step.   
 Wang Shaoguang’s chapter addresses one of the major rural development 
challenges for the contemporary Chinese state: ensuring affordable healthcare in the 
wake of the de-collectivization of agriculture.  Wang notes that a variety of cooperative 
medical schemes emerged as grassroots-initiated programs in the mid-1950s during the 
Maoist upsurge of rural collectivization, which (despite reversals in the 1960s) by the 
early 1970s provided nearly universal healthcare coverage for Chinese villagers.  
Although this impressive system was largely dismantled under the market reforms of the 
1980s, in very recent years the central government – drawing on the results of widespread 
experimental studies – has provided substantial subsidies to enable an unprecedented 
extension of the quasi-Maoist cooperative medical program. 
 Nara Dillon emphasizes the continuing importance of Maoist methods in the 
PRC’s handling of voluntary associations, nonprofits, and other elements of what is often 
termed “civil society.”  State control of this sector has been achieved not through the – 
oftentimes inefficient and corrupt – police apparatus or through universal bureaucratic 
enforcement, but through a low-cost, targeted approach that has served to isolate 
threatening social forces while sustaining the majority’s compliance with Communist 
Party rule.  In the 1950s, a series of mass struggle campaigns (an extension and 
elaboration of guerrilla tactics) proved an effective means of exerting authority over the 
voluntary sector.  Because of their selectivity, uncertainty, and attacks on the legitimacy 
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of their targets, such campaigns afforded the new Communist government considerable 
leverage. Despite important movement toward greater legalism in the post-Mao period, 
rectification reviews reminiscent of campaigns continue to serve as a critical instrument 
for taming this sector and thereby inhibiting the rise of an independent civil society.   
Dillon observes that these quasi-Maoist methods of control have been employed more 
frequently in the last few years. 
 If, as Dillon suggests, the NGO sector does not offer much ground for optimism 
about an imminent transition to democracy, via an emergent civil society, what about the 
legal arena?  Benjamin Liebman explores the legal reforms of the post-Mao era, finding 
in China’s current emphasis on legal aid, public hearings, and education about the law – 
all of which are unusual practices for authoritarian regimes – evidence not of incipient 
democracy, but rather of the continued importance of the legacy of revolutionary 
legalism. He argues that the susceptibility of Chinese legal institutions to influence by 
public opinion, popular protest, and the media reflect an abiding appreciation for “legal 
populism” that has been a central feature of  Chinese Communist legal theory and 
practice since the Jiangxi Soviet of the 1930s.  According to Liebman, although the first 
twenty years of post-Mao reform were marked by attempts to break with the 
revolutionary past in favour of international norms, in very recent years the PRC has 
returned to an emphasis upon its own unique legal model.  The 2000s have seen a shift 
away from adjudication and legal procedure back toward the forms of mediation that 
were more typical of Mao’s China. In the Maoist approach to legal institutions, law is 
designed to advance Party policy, not to restrain it.  Liebman concludes that 
contemporary Chinese courts diverge significantly from other comparative models – 
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democratic and authoritarian alike, opening the possibility for an alternative trajectory of 
legal development. 
 If the seeds of Chinese democracy do not lie in the legal sphere, what about the 
media?  Highlighting President Hu Jintao’s recent turn to the internet to “chat” with the 
populace, Zhao Yuezhi sees not the signs of political liberalization but instead “a digital 
age re-articulation of the CCP’s revolutionary hegemony, especially its mass line mode 
of political communication.”  Zhao also detects the revival of Maoist populism in the 
voices of many ordinary Chinese netizens, who have taken to the internet to criticize the 
post-Mao reforms as a betrayal of the revolution.  Somewhat counter-intuitively, perhaps, 
cutting-edge commercial technology has emerged as a powerful vehicle for conveying 
anti-market sentiments.  Articulating a concern for social justice and socialist renewal, 
internet discourse has rekindled a latent yearning for Maoist revolutionary values among 
some sectors of the population. 
 Like Zhao, Patricia Thornton notes the Chinese Communist Party’s continuing 
interest in “constructing public opinion.”  She emphasizes, however, the stark difference 
between Maoist social investigation efforts to stir class consciousness and post-Mao 
random survey methods that stifle mass criticism in favour of a “depoliticized choice-
making on the part of individual respondents.”  The mass line politics of Mao’s age have, 
according to Thornton, been supplanted by an engineering approach in which public 
opinion polls serve to disaggregate, and thereby defuse, awareness of and anger toward 
the growing socioeconomic inequalities generated by reform.  Although the Communist 
leadership retains its revolutionary-era concern for mass transformation, it seeks to 
achieve this familiar goal through new means.  The party’s epistemological and 
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methodological shift toward “scientific development” may not hasten political 
liberalization, but in Thornton’s words serve to “lubricate the global machinery of 
capitalism.” 
 Courts of law, media, and public opinion polls are not the only means of 
channelling mass interests, of course.  Grassroots government remains the primary 
mechanism for handling popular grievances.  Yet, as Joseph Fewsmith details in his 
chapter, sub-county governance in China is in serious trouble.   Because local 
administration is not well institutionalized – an outcome that Fewsmith attributes to the 
legacy of thin imperial rule followed by revolutionary efforts to control society – the 
system invites abuse on the part of unscrupulous cadres.  In some places, local party 
secretaries even employ organized criminal networks to enforce their will on restive 
villagers.  While Fewsmith reviews a number of recent experiments to reform local 
government, he stresses that – absent a fundamental transformation of the political 
system – such efforts are unlikely to curb cadre misbehaviour in any significant or 
systematic way.  Instead, like guerrilla leaders of the revolutionary era, grassroots 
officials today are largely unaccountable to the people they ostensibly serve. 
 Like Fewsmith, Jae Ho Chung points to the lingering influence of both imperial 
and revolutionary governance practices to explain enduring patterns of central-local 
relations.  Whereas Fewsmith highlights the negative consequences of these patterns for 
ordinary citizens, however, Chung underscores their positive contribution to political 
unity and stability.  Despite a centrifugal tradition that has been an integral part of 
Chinese history, Chung observes, central directives consistently trumped local discretion 
throughout the Mao period. In the 1950s and 1960s in particular, centralized ideological 
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control was so effective that it was “independent of bureaucratic institutions and mostly 
self-policing in its mode of operation” even in the midst of severe disruptions in the 
administrative system. Although post-Mao reforms loosened Beijing’s command over the 
localities and transformed central-local interactions, the center still wields a variety of 
effective controls (from communications channels to military might) for restraining 
regionalism and enforcing national policy. Chung offers no long-range prediction about 
the durability of the current political system.  But he concludes with a haunting 
hypothesis: “in the long run, properties of a Chinese dynasty may eventually overshadow 
the attributes of a communist regime.” 
 
Conclusion 
 Whether they present the particular Maoist inheritance under consideration in 
more negative or positive terms, the contributors agree on the value of investigating its 
continuing impact on contemporary practices.  A range of governing techniques – 
political-administrative, legal, social and economic – owe their origins to the Maoist past: 
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Table 1: 
Distinctive Contemporary Governance Techniques That Originate From Revolutionary 
and Mao Era (1927-1976) 
Political-Administrative Legal Social Economic 
institutional plasticity; strong 
informal networks; weak 
bureaucratic rules 
shifting balance in central-
local policy initiative; 
experiment-based policy 
generation 
weakly institutionalized 
central-local interactions; 
prohibition on collective 
action by local governments 
extensive propaganda work; 
active construction of public 
opinion 
political campaigns; circum-
venting bureaucratic inertia 
through populist appeals 
law and adjudication as 
malleable instruments to 
advance Party’s policies 
priority of Party decrees 
over law in policy 
implementation 
emphasis on mediation, 
informality and morality 
in dispute resolution 
judicial populism vs. 
judicial professionalism  
experimental regulation 
and legislation 
grassroots practices and 
on-site investigations 
as inputs into national 
policymaking 
managed campaigns for 
policy implementation 
controlled social 
polarization; careful 
targeting and staging of 
political repression  
discretionary approach 
to dealing with social 
groups and 
organizations 
guiding and educating 
society through model 
experiences 
policy objectives set by 
Party Center, policy 
instruments developed by 
localities  
policy implementation 
according to local 
circumstances  
generating economic 
policy change from 
experimental sites  
achieving “hard targets” 
(e.g. GDP growth rate) 
through cadre system 
incentives  
production and 
investment campaigns as 
short-term fixes to econ. 
bottlenecks 
Source: Selected findings from contributions to this volume. 
. 
Despite the authors’ emphasis on the continued salience of Maoist influences, no one 
claims that guerilla policy style explains everything or that it has remained unaltered. No 
one denies that this policy style has had a dreadful impact on political accountability and 
the legal system. And no one asserts that this policy style will save the Communist Party 
from political and social pressures that may result in future systemic transformation.  
Two core components of guerrilla policy style – ideological control and mass 
mobilization – have been substantially diluted in the reform era.  Under Mao, as Chung 
observes, centralized ideological control was at times so effective as to be “independent 
of bureaucratic institutions and mostly self-policing in its mode of operation.”  That 
reservoir of popular enthusiasm, or ideological conformism, facilitated the regime’s 
reliance on mass campaigns – in place of bureaucratic methods –during the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution.  Ideological indoctrination and mass upheaval were 
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seen by post-Mao leaders as among the most problematic elements of the Maoist legacy – 
responsible for preserving Communist Party rule at the expense of economic 
modernization. It was this conclusion that prompted Deng Xiaoping to declare an end to 
mass campaigns. Yet while ideologically inspired mass mobilization does not play the 
same central role in routine policy-making and administration these days, the ambitious 
propaganda effort to shape and manipulate public opinion has never ceased even if, as 
Thornton suggests, the goal has changed from mobilizing the masses for political action 
and personal sacrifice toward promoting passive compliance and commercial 
consumerism.   
The guerrilla policy style competes today (as it did intermittently even under Mao) 
with more conventional approaches: bureaucratic and law-based policy-making and 
implementation. “Regularizing” governance has become a core theme of the Chinese 
leadership since the 1980s. China’s bureaucratic and legal systems have been extended 
and modernized to a degree well beyond anything in the Mao era. But, as the chapters of 
this volume argue, inherited and adapted elements of guerrilla policy still play a vital role 
in dealing with crucial policy tasks, from mobilization in times of perceived crisis 
through managing central-local interactions to facilitating economic policy innovation 
and reorganizing public health care.  Designed to handle a changing, complex, and 
unpredictable environment in a pro-active manner, the guerrilla policy approach – for 
better and for worse – remains politically potent. 
What emerges from studying the legacies of revolutionary and Mao era policy 
styles in contemporary Chinese governance is not a ready-made “Chinese model” defined 
by replicable institutional variables. We find rather a fluid, context-, situation- and 
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agency-based modus operandi: a method of policy generation and implementation based 
on an acceptance of pervasive uncertainty, a readiness to experiment and learn (even 
from enemies and foreigners), an agility in grasping unforeseen opportunities, a single-
mindedness in pursuing strategic goals, a willingness to ignore ugly side effects and a 
ruthlessness in eradicating unfriendly opposition.  
Since the guerrilla approach to policy generation and implementation is 
experimentalist and non-repetitive, it is not best conceptualized as an “informal 
institution”.45 Whether formal or informal, institutions are designed to contain 
uncertainty and stabilize actors’ expectations about future interactions by specifying 
certain norms and rules. In contrast, the rationale behind guerrilla policy-making is 
precisely to embrace uncertainty in order to benefit from it. The guerrilla policy approach 
is driven precisely by the determination to overcome or eliminate existing constraints, 
rather than to work within them. 
Guerrilla policy style pursues a decidedly change- and agency-oriented agenda. It 
constitutes a type of transformative governance geared to overcoming the status quo. It is 
not directed to systemic and institutional consolidation, unlike polities that regard 
themselves as advanced or mature systems and therefore cling to an implicitly protective 
type of governance. Table 2 juxtaposes as ideal types the transformative and protective 
policy styles. 
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Table 2: Transformative vs. Protective Policy Styles and Adaptive Capacity 
 Transformative (Guerrilla) Policy Style Protective Policy Style 
 
overriding 
policy goal  
overcoming status quo defending/incrementally improving status 
quo 
institutional 
structure 
fluid institutional arrangements fixed institutional arrangements 
shifting division of labor between 
different administrative levels 
constitutionally defined division of labor 
between different administrative levels 
policy process agency-oriented (“politics in command”; 
“push and seize”) 
structure-oriented (rigid institutional checks; 
“anticipate and regulate”) 
policymakers with considerable 
discretionary powers 
policymakers bound to formal rules 
experimentalist legalistic 
active management of uncertainty  
through policy experimentation 
attempt to contain uncertainty  
through extensive legal provisions 
maximum exposure to random 
discoveries of novel policy solutions 
minimal exposure to random discoveries 
of novel policy solutions 
adaptive 
capacity 
policy-driven (ad-hoc, periodically 
volatile) 
law-based (pre-stabilized), market-driven 
possibility of swift, “big leap” adaptation 
and innovation 
incremental, “small step” adjustments 
political 
accountability 
cast aside to facilitate maximum policy 
flexibility 
emphasized as foundation of rule of law 
 
To reiterate, the Chinese guerrilla policy style is not a generic feature of 
Communist countries. In contrast to the PRC, the socialist states of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, after their Stalinist phase, strove to defend, and improve only 
incrementally on, the status quo. They made every effort to solidify their rule, not to 
reinvent it repeatedly.  The latter was a uniquely Maoist imperative. Since the guerrilla 
policy style rests on fluid institutional arrangements, the adaptation of party-state 
institutions to new economic priorities proved much less problematic in China than in the 
former Soviet and Eastern European Communist party-states, despite a series of reform 
efforts from Khrushchev through Gorbachev.46 
These important differences between the PRC and other Communist systems 
suggest that the preoccupation with institutional analysis and regime typologies 
characteristic of many Western studies of China’s political economy may be misplaced. 
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Communist Party rule has proven adaptive in China not because of its institutional 
foundations (which were as clumsy and fragmented as in the former Communist party-
states of Eastern Europe) but because of a pervasive policy style that encouraged diverse 
and flexible responses to fundamentally redefined development priorities and to large-
scale changes in the domestic and global environment. 
The difficulty in trying to force China’s development experience into the 
procrustean bed of conventional institutional categories is not accidental: The dynamics 
and capacities of China’s political system are driven by particular patterns that are ill 
suited to such a taxonomic exercise. A methodological alternative, whose advantages we 
hope to demonstrate in this volume, is to intensify research on the deviant 
(unconventional or even unique) and varying policy mechanisms that have propelled 
change in important sectors of China’s government, economy, society and international 
relations. More generally, the power of policy creativity deserves greater emphasis in 
discussions about how to facilitate change in developing, emerging, and even advanced 
political economies.47 
A serious analysis of China’s transformative style of governance not only helps to 
explain the peculiarities of the Chinese case (by going beyond static and linear 
institutionalist, path-dependency perspectives). It also poses a potential challenge to 
presently more developed political economies struggling to keep up with the accelerated 
pace of change in the 21st century, while saddled with a strong institutional status quo 
bias48 and weak policy corrective mechanisms. The adaptive capacity of China’s non-
democratic political system offers a radical alternative to the bland governance models 
favored by many Western social scientists who seem to take the political stability and 
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economic superiority of capitalist democracies for granted. To increase policy agility and 
strengthen the resilience of democratic rule in the 21st century may require an intellectual 
effort willing to question 20th century assumptions about systemic superiority by taking a 
sober look at the foundations of innovative capacity displayed by non-democratic 
challengers such as China.  
Again, the Chinese guerrilla policy style has fundamental flaws: lack of political 
accountability, undue administrative discretion, and distributive deficiencies that 
contribute to severe regional and social tensions. The most serious long-term shortcoming, 
beyond its fundamentally undemocratic nature, may lie in the single-minded pursuit of 
strategic policy goals (e.g., economic growth or demographic control) with little regard 
for the deleterious side-effects that often emerge only over time (e.g., environmental 
destruction or gender imbalance). As the demand from Chinese society for political 
accountability, legal entitlements, social safety and environmental protection grows, 
public tolerance for guerrilla-style policy-making may well decline. The hard test for 
China’s adaptive capacity will be some massive crisis in which not only economic and 
social learning, but also political-institutional responsiveness and popular support for the 
government are stretched to the limit. As Andrew Nathan warns in a recent essay on 
“authoritarian impermanence,”  
What keeps such crises of government from becoming crises of the 
regime are cultures of open dissent, the robust rule of law, and the 
institutional capacity to change leaders in response to public discontent 
without changing the system . . . Without them, the authoritarian 
regime must perform constantly like a team of acrobats on a high wire, 
staving off all crises while keeping its act flawlessly together. Today . . 
. the regime is managing to do that. But it cannot afford to slip.49 
Again, we make no predictions about the future of China’s high-wire performance.  
Taking a page out of the Chinese policymakers’ playbook, we too may be well advised to 
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“embrace uncertainty.”  But, however long before the curtain closes on China’s virtuoso 
acrobatic act, we do insist that it has been sufficiently sure-footed to date to merit a more 
complete explanation of where it came from. 
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